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Executive Summary

Refund to Savings 2015–2016:
Field Experiments to Promote Tax-Time Saving in
Low- and Moderate-Income Households

T

Stephen P. Roll, Genevieve Davison, Michal Grinstein-Weiss,
Mathieu R. Despard, and Sam Bufe

he Refund to Savings (R2S) Initiative is a
collaborative effort of Washington University
in St. Louis, Duke University, and Intuit, the
makers of TurboTax. With the tools of behavioral
economics, the initiative has constructed and tests
low-touch, scalable interventions designed to
encourage tax-time saving in an online tax preparation
environment. Specifically, R2S encourages low- and
moderate-income (LMI) tax filers to deposit some of
their federal tax refund into a savings account.
The R2S Initiative embeds interventions within
TurboTax Freedom Edition (TTFE), an online taxpreparation platform available for free to LMI filers.
We randomly assign participants to intervention or
control groups and thus are able to precisely identify
the impacts of our interventions. Now in its sixth year
(from 2012 into 2018), the initiative has led tens of
thousands of additional households to deposit their
tax refunds into savings. Past R2S experiments have
shown that it is possible to increase rates of tax-time
savings deposits among LMI filers through the use of
framing and messaging strategies as well as anchoring
and choice architecture (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2015).
In 2013, the first full-scale R2S experiment explored
the effects of motivational messaging prompts and
suggested savings amounts (or, savings anchors) on the
tax-time savings behavior of 680,545 TTFE users. We
found that anchors are effective at increasing both
the rate of refund savings deposits and the average
amount of refund deposited to savings. We also found
that messaging has positive but more modest effects
(Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2015). In 2015 and 2016, the
years covered in this report, we continued to examine
different approaches to motivational messaging while
also exploring the roles that choice architecture plays

in driving tax-time savings behavior. We tested these
behavioral mechanisms on 646,116 participants in
2015 and on 284,125 in 2016. In the 2015 iteration of
R2S, we also used an online, longitudinal survey to
assess the effects of the interventions 6 months after
tax filing. We administered the survey to a subset of
participants at two points: Immediately after they filed
their taxes and again 6 months later.
The 2015 and 2016 R2S experiments build on prior
years by testing the effects of choice architecture and
different messaging strategies on tax refund savings
behavior. We found that, in 2015, a choice architecture
making the option to deposit to savings more salient
for tax filers, in combination with savings-focused
messages, drove substantial increases in rates of
depositing the tax refund to savings vehicles. In
2016, we attempted to separate the effects of choice
architecture from the effects of messaging and found
that choice architecture by itself increased tax-time
savings deposits. The additional effects of messaging
were minimal, but we found that messaging on
emergency savings appeared to be more effective than
messaging on the two other topics. The 2015 and 2016
interventions also found that refund-splitting rates—
the rates at which filers split the refund by depositing
it in more than one account—are quite low (less than
1% for all groups).
This report also details the effects of the 2015 R2S
experiment 6 months after the point of tax filing.
We found that treatment participants were generally
no more likely than control-group participants to
have any of the refund saved after 6 months, but a
surprising finding emerged when we examined only
the refund savings of nonstudents with persistent
financial constraints: The percentage with any of

the refund saved after 6 months was higher among
those exposed to any R2S intervention than among
counterparts in the control group. And this effect
was more pronounced among those who indicated
at tax time that they could not access $2,000 in
an emergency. This suggests that the effects of the
R2S interventions persist over 6 months and may
disproportionately benefit the participants most in
need of emergency savings.

Key Findings
the 2015 and 2016 intervention years, R2S generated 29,536
additional savers and an additional $48 million deposited to
savings vehicles.

Across

changing the way refund deposit options were presented—
also referred to as choice architecture—increased rates of tax refund
savings deposits by 43%.

Simply

savings impacts of the R2S interventions persisted across 6
months among nonstudents with persistent financial constraints.

The

around saving for emergencies appeared to be the most
effective messaging prompt and was particularly effective among
nonstudents who had persistent financial constraints and no
emergency savings at tax time.

Messaging

overall savings deposit rates of TTFE filers have increased in each
year of the R2S Initiative. This possibly indicates that once tax filers
are nudged to deposit into savings accounts, these behaviors persist
through subsequent years of tax filing.

The
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Part 1

Background: Refund to Savings

T

he Refund to Savings (R2S) Initiative is an
ongoing collaboration between academia and
industry partners, including researchers from
Washington University in St. Louis, Duke University,
and Intuit, Inc., the makers of TurboTax. The purpose
of the initiative is to leverage insights from the field
of behavioral economics to develop low-cost, lowtouch, scalable interventions to promote tax refund
savings among LMI households. This research has
been ongoing since 2012 and continues through the
present day.
This report covers the design and impacts of the R2S
experiments in the 2015 and 2016 tax seasons (which
include the 2014 and 2015 tax years), and also includes
results from a 6-month follow-up survey conducted
in 2015 to assess how the impacts of R2S interventions
persist over time. These interventions reached a large
number of tax filers in both of these years; 646,116 in
2015 and 284,125 in 2016.
The 2015 and 2016 R2S interventions primarily
explored the impact of two behavioral mechanisms
(detailed below) on tax refund savings behaviors:
1. Choice architecture, or how the options in a given
decision are structured and presented to the
decision maker. Specifically, we investigated how
providing a choice architecture that emphasized
saving the entire tax refund impacted savings
deposit behaviors.
2. Persuasive messaging, or how providing different
types of messages or framing around decisions
can motivate people to act. In 2015 and 2016, we
explored how a variety of savings messages—
including messages around emergencies,
retirement, and general financial goals—impacted
savings deposit behaviors.

By comparing interventions that incorporate choice
architecture and persuasive messaging to promote
savings with a control group that received no
savings intervention, we are able to assess the causal
impact of these interventions on tax-refund savings
behaviors. We also compare savings behaviors across
intervention conditions to better understand the
relationships between different persuasive-messaging
approaches and tax-refund savings behaviors.

Research Questions
Do the R2S interventions impact refund-savings

deposit behaviors at tax time?
What are the contributions of choice architecture

and persuasive messaging in driving savings
deposits at tax time?
What types of savings messages are the

most effective at driving savings deposits?
What is the overall impact of the R2S

interventions 6 months after tax filing?
Are the R2S interventions more effective for

households with persistent financial constraints
than for other sampled households?
How does access to emergency savings moderate

the 6-month impact of R2S interventions?

The R2S Initiative … makes an effort to complement other asset-building programs by creating a set of low-touch,
scalable, flexible interventions to encourage households to save their own money at a key moment: when
they are set to receive their tax refund.

In the rest of this report, we first present the
background and motivation for this research, and
outline the prior research done on the R2S Initiative.
Then we provide a detailed overview of the 2015
and 2016 experiments, the methods of analysis, and
the impacts on tax-time savings deposits. Following
the tax time analysis, we present the motivation
for, methods of, and results from an analysis of the
6-month impacts of the R2S interventions. Finally,
we present conclusions and detail several policy
implications from this work.

The Importance of Saving in
LMI Households
Public policies aimed at improving the financial wellbeing of low- and moderate-income (LMI) households
typically pursue that goal through income-maintenance
programs like Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families, consumption-support programs like the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, and work
incentives like the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
Although these programs are valuable, income is only
one component of financial well-being. Income- and
consumption-maintenance programs can, for example,
put food on the table or help parents to purchase
necessities for their children, but they are generally
inadequate at protecting households from financial
emergencies or at facilitating long-term investments,
including higher education, a down payment on a
house, and the accumulation of retirement assets.
Since the mid-1980s, researchers, policymakers,
and practitioners have increasingly recognized that
building assets, or wealth, is an important component
of helping LMI households emerge from poverty.
2 // JUNE 2018

In Assets and the Poor (1991), Michael Sherraden laid
the foundation for much of the asset building field
and highlighted the ways asset building can improve
social welfare. Assets enable long-term investments
and afford protection when emergencies arise.
But Sherraden also identified other mechanisms
by which assets can improve the well-being of
households. They enable households to focus on
long-term financial goals and plan for the future.
Assets foster positive expectations for one’s future
and for the future of one’s children. They can make
it possible to develop other assets (e.g., income or
other assets accumulated as a result of investments
in education or homeownership). And assets can
influence personal efficacy—the belief in one’s
ability to succeed. Subsequent research has identified
additional potential benefits for financially constrained
populations: The accumulation of assets is associated
with the reduction of stress and anxiety (e.g., Carter,
Blakely, Collings, Gunasekara, & Richardson, 2009;
Roll, Taylor, & Grinstein-Weiss, 2016) as well as with
the improvement of decision making processes,
improvement that stems from the reduction of
financial constraints (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013).
Despite the importance of savings to long-term
financial security and overall well-being, research on
the financial lives of American households has shown
that many possess little or no savings. A study from
Pew Charitable Trusts (2015a) found that 41% of all
U.S. households could not cover a $2,000 emergency
expense and that 78% of low-income households could
not cover one. A separate survey found that 26% of
Americans had no emergency savings at all (Ross,
2014). A lack of basic emergency savings can leave
households vulnerable to financial shocks such as job
loss, unexpected medical expenses, or unexpected
vehicle repair. And financial shocks are common: Pew

Many IDA programs also require account holders to
participate in financial education.

found that 60% of American households experienced
one within the past year (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2015b).
Households that cannot afford the cost of emergency
expenses are at greater risk of incurring debt,
including high-interest debt from such sources as
payday loans, and are vulnerable to material hardship
(Barr, 2012; Chase, Gjertson, & Collins, 2011; Couch,
Daly, & Gardiner, 2011; Heflin, London, & Scott, 2011;
Rawlings & Gentsch, 2008).

In contrast, CDAs are typically savings or investment
accounts seeded with an initial deposit and grown
through parental contributions that may be matched.
For example, the Harold Alfond College Challenge
provides $500 at birth to every child born as a resident
of Maine (Prosperity Now, n.d.-a). Moreover, CDAs
feature other components intended to improve the
financial well-being of participants. Many provide some
form of financial education and specify rules on how
the CDA funds can be used (e.g., for higher education).

In addition to a lack of emergency savings, numerous
other disparities distinguish LMI households from
households with higher income: educational outcomes
and attainment, homeownership rates, and retirement
savings are particularly relevant in the current context.
Engle and Tinto (2008) found that only 34% of lowincome, first-generation college students earned their
bachelor’s degree within 6 years, but the rate was 66%
among peers with higher incomes who were not firstgeneration college students. Another study found that,
as of 2014, households in the top quintile of income
were 2.2 times more likely to be homeowners than
were those in the bottom quintile (Prosperity Now,
n.d.-b). And in 2015, more than half of households
earning less than $40,000 per year had no savings
for retirement; in comparison, about 30% of all U.S.
households lacked retirement savings (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2016).

Evaluations of both IDA and CDA programs have
found promising results. An experimental evaluation
of an IDA program in Oklahoma found that IDAs
increased the homeownership rates among renters by
7 percentage points (Mills et al., 2008). A more recent
evaluation found that an IDA program in New Mexico
and California increased median liquid assets held by
participants and decreased their rates of hardship and
alternative financial service use (e.g., check cashing;
Mills et al., 2016). Research from CDA evaluations has
been similarly positive. Incentives that the Canada
Education Savings Program offered to encourage
saving for children’s postsecondary education have
led to a steady increase in the amount of money
that Canadian households save and to an increase
in the amount of money they spend on education
(Employment and Social Development Canada, 2015).

Over the last 25 years, many efforts have been made to
address these disparities. Prominent among them are
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) and Child
Development Accounts (CDAs): IDAs tend to focus on
low-income households and do not exclusively target
children whereas CDAs were designed to be available
to all children regardless of socioeconomic status.
The money deposited into IDAs is fully or partially
matched, and use of the accrued savings is restricted
to investments for specified purposes (e.g., to finance
housing, education, or the launch of a small business).

In the United States, Maine’s NextGen plan offers
matching grants to residents who open 529 college
savings accounts, and an evaluation found that annual
matching grants appear to be associated with higher
annual savings (Clancy, Han, Mason, & Sherraden,
2006). The SEED for Oklahoma Kids experiment,
a large-scale study of CDAs for randomly selected
newborns in Oklahoma, found that the program
increased the rate at which the treatment group

Figure 1. Average federal refund, housing payment, and monthly gross income. The figure shows averages for all participants
in the 2016 Household Financial Survey and for those receiving the federal Earned Income Tax Credit. Monthly housing payment is shown
for filers whose payment does not equal zero.
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Table 1. Tools of Behavioral Economics Employed by the R2S Initiative from 2012 to 2016
Behavioral Mechanism

Details of Mechanism

Intervention
Year

Decision framing
and messaging

Individuals are susceptible to sudden shifts in perception, and these shifts can be based upon
the way that information is presented. This form of cognitive bias is called a framing effect. The
R2S Initiative has used several framing approaches over the years. Examples include reminding
participants about the possibility of emergency expenses as well as asking them to think about
their goals for the future and for retirement.

2012–2016

Anchoring

People have a tendency to stay on or near a suggested reference point. Anchoring is commonly
experienced in negotiations involving “low-balling” or “high-balling” tactics. For example, a
car dealer may set a high sticker price with the hope of increasing the final sale price. In 2012
and 2013, the R2S interventions suggested to participants that they should save a specific
percentage of their refund (e.g., 50%) or a specific amount (e.g., $250). The suggestion was
designed to anchor the participant’s choice to a specific savings target.

2012–2014

Choice architecture

At the crucial moment when individuals weigh choices, the environment and its features can
impact decisions. The R2S Initiative has altered the choice architecture of the deposit screen
where TTFE users select how they want to receive their refund. Specifically, the option to deposit
to savings was placed first in the list, and the option to save the entire refund was placed above
the option to save a part of the refund.

2012–2016

Note. R2S = Refund to Savings Initiative; TTFE = TurboTax Freedom Edition.
opened accounts and deposited in them as well as
the amount of savings (Zager, Kim, Nam, Clancy, &
Sherraden, 2010). Other research has found that the
program also impacted parents’ expectations for their
children and led to improvements in a number of
psychosocial outcomes (Huang, Sherraden, Kim, and
Clancy, 2014; Kim, Sherraden, Huang, & Clancy, 2015;
Wikoff, Huang, Kim, & Sherraden, 2015).
Although IDA and CDA programs have been successful
in improving participant outcomes and should
be scaled up to reach more households, they are
ultimately high-touch efforts requiring consistent
funding, infrastructure development (i.e., account
maintenance, transmission of matching funds, rule
enforcement), and political buy-in at large scales (i.e.,
at city, state, and national levels). The R2S Initiative—
which is also guided by the perspective that assets and
income are key components of financial security and
well-being—makes an effort to complement other
asset-building programs by creating a set of lowtouch, scalable, flexible interventions to encourage
households to save their own money at a key moment:
when they are set to receive their tax refund.

Building Savings at Tax Time
Tax time has been identified as a “savable moment” for
LMI households (Tufano, Schneider, & Beverly, 2005,
1). This is, in part, due to the fact that the tax refund is
the largest lump sum payment many LMI households
4 // JUNE 2018

will receive all year. Our research with R2S participants
can put tax time’s importance into perspective: In 2016,
the $1,602 average federal refund received by our LMI
study participants was equal to 2.1 times their average
monthly housing payment and 1.3 times their average
monthly gross income. For EITC recipients in our
study, whose refunds averaged $2,908 in 2016, these
figures increased to 3.8 and 2.2, respectively (Figure 1).
Many LMI households experience dramatic income
constraints, and tax time may be the only point in the
year when they can afford to save—that is, the only time
when their income exceeds their expenses by enough
to realistically allow them to set aside some money
for emergencies or other financial goals (Barr, 2012;
Grinstein-Weiss, Russell, Gale, Key, & Ariely, 2017).
Other factors make tax time opportune for
promoting saving. Tax filing is a nearly universal
experience in the United States. In the 2016 taxfiling season, the Internal Revenue Service processed
152,250,000 tax returns and issued 111,069,000
refunds. The average refund was $2,860. What’s
more, over a third of tax filers prepared their own tax
return (Internal Revenue Service, 2016). Thus, online
tax-preparation environments are attractive venues
for promoting tax time saving. Tax time also presents
an attractive opportunity for behavioral intervention
because taxpayers who have filed their taxes know
how much money they will receive through their
refund but still have time to decide where to deposit
it. The R2S Initiative seeks to intervene in that
moment of decision.

Using Behavioral Economics to
Promote Savings at Tax Time
As a means of encouraging filers to save their tax
refund, the R2S Initiative uses the tools of behavioral
economics to design savings interventions embedded
within the TurboTax Freedom Edition (TTFE)
tax-preparation platform. Research in behavioral
economics has found that much of our decision
making is not wholly rational; it is influenced by
psychological, social, and emotional processes (Ariely,
2010, 2011; Becker, 1976; Caplan, 2000; De Bondt &
Thaler, 1994; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky,
1979; List, 2004). However, our behavior is irrational in
systematic and predictable ways. By using behavioral
principles to structure the environment in which
individuals make tax filing decisions, we can encourage
them to save the tax refund. Over the years, R2S has
explored the use of a number of behavioral tools:
framing to influence decisions through persuasive
messaging, anchoring, and using choice architecture
(see Table 1 for an overview of interventions across the
years). This section provides background information
on the tools.

Decision Framing and Messaging
Presenting information in a certain way, or framing it,
has been shown to influence behavior (Epley, Mak, &
Idson, 2006). For example, people have a tendency to
discount the future when making decisions (Benhabib,
Bisin, & Schotter, 2010), and this may explain why
many do not save enough money for retirement
(Diamond & Köszegi, 2003). People also tend to
assume that their life circumstances will improve in the
future (Bryan & Hershfield, 2012), an assumption that
may cause them to underestimate the likelihood of
financial shocks such as car repairs, medical expenses,
and job loss.

Anchoring
Anchoring refers to the use of informational markers
or points of reference to influence decisions
involving the selection of a value (Munro & Sugden,
2003; Sen, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). When
anchors are provided, people have a tendency to
stay on or near the anchor (Simmons, LeBoeuf, &
Nelsom, 2010). For example, minimum payment
thresholds for credit cards can function as anchors
that bias households toward making payments closer
to these minimums (Hershfield & Roese, 2015). Other
research has found that higher retirement savings
cues provided in emails are associated with increases
in retirement savings contributions (Choi, Haisley,
Kurkoski, & Massey, 2017).

Choice Architecture
Choice architecture involves the organization of decision
environments to influence choice, often in ways that
do not restrict the actual choices available (Thaler
& Sunstein, 2008). A list of options is an example
of choice architecture; the architecture, or order of
choices, can be configured to suggest the optimal
choice—such as by placing an option first to maximize
its salience. A now classic example comes from the
presentation of choices in a cafeteria checkout line:
Placing healthy items first in the line and unhealthy
choices last increases the likelihood that consumers
will purchase the healthy options and reduces the
likelihood that they will purchase the unhealthy
ones (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Other examples of
choice architecture interventions include presenting
information about a choice or purchase in a clear and
salient way (e.g., nutritional labeling) and providing
instantaneous feedback on an action (e.g., cars that use
noisy alerts if a rider is not wearing a seat belt). Choice
architecture has been effectively applied in a number
of contexts, including Medicare drug plans (Congdon,
Kling, & Mullainathan, 2011) and retirement savings
(Thaler & Benartzi, 2004).

Prior R2S Research
on Tax Time Savings
Piloted in 2012, the R2S Initiative examined the effects
of anchoring and messaging on tax-time savings
behavior among LMI tax filers (Grinstein-Weiss et
al., 2017). Specifically, the pilot experiment randomly
assigned 107,632 TTFE users to a control condition
or one of eight intervention groups. Each of the eight
interventions exposed group members to a suggestion
that they save a percentage of the refund (either 25%
or 75%). The suggestion was intended to anchor the
filers to the suggested amount. Two groups received
no additional messaging prompt, and six groups saw
one of three messaging prompts: one on emergency
savings, one on financial goals, or one on retirement.
The 2012 pilot found that the likelihood of placing a
portion of the refund into a savings vehicle and the
amount deposited into a savings vehicle (i.e., a savings
account or U.S. savings bond) was greater among
participants in any intervention group than among
counterparts in the control group. The pilot also found
that the amount of refund deposited to savings was
associated with the anchor shown: Those shown the
75% anchor deposited more than those shown the 25%
anchor. However, the effects of the different messaging
prompts were quite weak, showing little to no impact
on savings deposits.
The 2013 R2S experiment expanded on the 2012
pilot’s design by testing four messaging conditions
CSD.WUSTL.EDU // 5

In 2016, the $1,602 average federal refund received by our
LMI study participants was equal to 2.1 times their average

monthly housing payment and 1.3 times their average
monthly gross income. For recipients of the EITC, these
figures increased to 3.8 and 2.2, respectively.

and five different savings anchors on 680,545 TTFE
filers (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2015). The messaging
conditions included a generic prompt encouraging
saving but not mentioning any specific motive to save,
an emergency prompt highlighting having enough
savings to weather an emergency, a family prompt
encouraging filers to think about the current or future
needs of their family, and a future prompt giving filers
general encouragement to save for the future. The
savings anchors shown to tax filers included suggested
savings amounts of 25% of the refund, 50% of the
refund, 75% of the refund, $100, and $250.
Analyses of the 2013 R2S experiment showed that the
anchors increased rates of tax time savings deposits by
0.8 to 1.2 percentage points and that higher anchors
were associated with greater rates of savings deposits. In
addition to demonstrating that the rates of saving were
higher among filers shown the emergency and future
prompts than among counterparts shown the generic
prompt, the 2013 interventions increased the total
amount deposited to savings and the rate of splitting
the refund between a savings account and some other
account.2 The overall rate of refund splitting among all
treatment groups was fairly low (1.55%).
The 2013 research also examined the impacts of the
R2S interventions 6 months after households filed
their taxes. We found that participants in intervention
groups with higher anchors were more likely than
control-group members to report having some of the
refund saved after 6 months (e.g., 30% of participants
in the 75% anchor group and 26% of the control group
still had some refund saved), and participants in
those intervention groups saved a higher proportion
of their refund (e.g., 19% of the 75% anchor group vs.
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15% of the control group). Both at HFS1 and at HFS2,3
the percentage of filers reporting that they could
come up with $2,000 in an emergency was higher
among those in the 75% anchor group than among
counterparts in the control group (Grinstein-Weiss
et al., 2015). Taken together, these results suggest that
the impact of the R2S interventions extends at least 6
months beyond tax time.
Because access to a savings vehicle is an essential
part of the decision to save one’s refund, the 2013
R2S interventions tested whether it was possible to
induce filers who lacked a savings account to open
one. The analyses indicated that the share of filers
who lacked a savings account at tax time but had one
6 months later was greater among those assigned
to an R2S intervention than among counterparts in
the control group (Despard, Grinstein-Weiss, Guo,
& De Ruyter, 2018). Finally, analyses with the 2013
data compared R2S participants who deposited any
of their refund into savings with counterparts who
deposited nothing, examining reported experiences
of various hardships in the 6 months following
tax filing. Filers who deposited any of the refund
into savings were found to be less likely to report
that they experienced food insecurity or material
hardship (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2016).

Part 2

The Tax-Time Savings Experiments

The 2015 and 2016 R2S Interventions
The yearly, iterative nature of the R2S Initiative allows
the research team to build on prior interventions in
each subsequent year. The next two sections describe
the 2015 and 2016 interventions as well as efforts to
build upon prior experiences. In our analysis of data
from both of these intervention years, we have sought
to answer the following primary research questions:

Do the R2S interventions impact refund savings
deposit behaviors at tax time?

What are the contributions of choice architecture
and persuasive messaging in driving savings
deposits at tax time?

What types of savings messages are the most
effective at driving savings deposits?
In supplemental analyses, we also examined the
overall incremental impact of these interventions on
aggregate savings deposits and the total amount of the
refund deposited into savings accounts. We further
trace the results of the R2S interventions over time
and explore the implications of these results for the
long-term impacts of tax-time savings interventions.

The 2015 interventions therefore shifted the focus
away from splitting, instead encouraging participants
to deposit the entire refund into savings vehicles.
The 2015 interventions also incorporated interactive
messaging prompts in which filers could indicate their
savings goals on the refund-deposit screen. These were
designed to further motivate filers to save.
Participants were randomly assigned to a control
group or one of three intervention groups. The
interventions combined an intentionally configured
choice architecture with different messaging strategies
designed to encourage saving. In contrast, the control
group was exposed to the three deposit options shown
in Figure 2: Filers could transfer the refund into a bank
account by direct deposit, receive the refund via a paper
check, or split the refund across multiple accounts.4
Although filers could deposit their refund into a savings
account after they selected the bank account option, the
control condition did not specifically emphasize saving.
By contrast, each of the three 2015 intervention
conditions configured choice architecture to emphasize
the two savings options: The first—and likely the most
salient—savings option was to deposit the entire refund

Figure 2. Deposit options shown to the control group (2015).

The 2015 R2S Interventions
In 2013, the R2S interventions were largely oriented
around using anchoring techniques to encourage
filers to deposit a suggested amount of their refund
into savings vehicles and to deposit the remainder
into some other account. Although the interventions
were effective at increasing the number of people
who made savings deposits at tax time, only 1.55% of
participants split the refund. This suggested that people
prefer to deposit the refund into a single account.

into a savings account, functionally anchoring filers to
save 100% of their refund. The second option invited
filers to split their refund between a savings account
and some other account. Figure 3 presents a screenshot
showing one of the three intervention conditions (the
other two are shown in Appendix A of this report).
Each of the three intervention conditions employed
a different messaging strategy. Messages in the first
condition emphasized the importance of saving for
emergencies (the Precautionary Saving condition),
messages in the second one used an interactive
prompt to encourage participants to think about
future goals (the Interactive Goal condition), and
messages in the third condition used an interactive
prompt to encourage thinking about hopes for
retirement (the Interactive Retirement condition).
The interface allowed the user to click on an image
associated with each goal.

Figure 3. Deposit screen shown to the Interactive Goal
intervention group (2015). This intervention is an example of
choice architecture combined with an interactive prompt.

The 2016 R2S Interventions
As this report shows, changes to the choice architecture
in 2015 led to strong increases in the rate at which
filers deposited their tax refund into a savings vehicle.
However, we noticed that the overall levels of interaction
with the interactive messaging prompts were low: Only
1.4% of filers clicked on the interactive prompts in the
Interactive Goal condition, and only 0.5% clicked on the
prompts in the Interactive Retirement condition. The
2016 interventions therefore built on the 2015 work by
developing interventions designed to enhance the effect
of messaging. It also structured the interventions to get
clear experimental reads on the impact of different types
of messaging.
For the 2016 intervention, filers saw either the control
condition or one of three treatment conditions that
emphasized saving the refund (Figures 4, 5, and 6).5 The
three treatment conditions in 2016 sought to allow a
comparison of the effects of choice architecture alone
and its effects in combination with different messaging
approaches. Language in the two messaging conditions
referenced saving for emergencies. Participants in one,
the Choice Architecture + Noninteractive Emergency
Messaging group, were shown a passive prompt with
messaging around the need for emergency savings.
Participants in the other, the Choice Architecture +
Interactive Emergency Messaging group, were shown
an interactive prompt that invited them to identify
their emergency savings needs. To overcome the
lack of engagement with the 2015 prompts, the 2016
experiment attempted to increase the salience of this
interactive element; the message was put on its own
screen (in 2015, it was shown on the side of the deposit
screen), and the choices made there were incorporated
into a second messaging prompt on the filing screen
(see Figures 7 and 8 for illustrations). Interaction with
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Figure 4. Deposit options shown to the control group (2016).

Figure 5. Deposit screen shown to the Choice
Architecture intervention group (2016). This condition
only utilized choice architecture.

the prompt was not required, however, and filers could
skip the screen if they chose. In addition to encouraging
savings deposits among LMI tax filers, a goal of the 2016
savings interventions was to isolate the effects of choice
architecture independent of those from messaging while
comparing a messaging strategy that strongly promoted
participant engagement with one that did not.

Methods
Sample and Data
Figure 6. Deposit screen shown to the Choice Architecture
+ Emergency Messaging intervention group (2016). This
condition used both choice architecture and a noninteractive prompt
to promote saving.

Figure 7. The first deposit screen shown to the Choice
Architecture + Interactive Emergency Messaging
intervention group (2016). This condition used an interactive
prompt on its own screen to encourage participant engagement
with the message.

Participants
The thresholds to qualify for the TTFE product change
slightly from year to year. In general, filers must receive
the EITC, have relatively low income, or be on active
military duty and have income below a specified
threshold. In 2015, tax filers qualified for TTFE if
they had an adjusted gross income (AGI) of less than
$31,000, if they qualified for the EITC, or if a member
of their household was on active military duty and the
household had an AGI of less than $60,000. In 2016,
the EITC and general income thresholds remained the
same, but the qualifying military AGI threshold was
$61,000. In each year, most TTFE filers qualified by
meeting the general income-threshold requirement.
Both the 2015 and the 2016 experiments ran for the
entirety of their respective tax seasons. The total
sample in 2015 consisted of 646,116 participants who
filed their taxes with TTFE and received a tax refund.
In 2016, the sample consisted of 284,125 TTFE tax
filers who received a refund.6

Data Collection
The R2S Initiative draws data from two primary sources:
administrative tax data on TTFE filers and longitudinal
data from the HFS. Participation and response rates are
summarized in Table 2.

Figure 8. The second deposit screen shown to the
Choice Architecture + Interactive Emergency Messaging
intervention group (2016). The second screen incorporated
any selections made on the first screen into another, noninteractive
prompt emphasizing emergency saving as well as choice architecture.

Administrative Tax Data from TTFE.—Intuit provides
the aggregated, anonymized administrative data on all
TTFE users receiving refunds. This data set includes
information on filing status (e.g., single, married
and filing jointly, or married and filing separately),
number of dependents, age, income, tax credits,
tax deductions, and amount of refund received.
The data set also includes indicators identifying
the experimental condition to which each filer was
assigned and, if applicable, how each interacted
with the intervention (i.e., whether the filer clicked
on an interactive messaging prompt). In addition, a
variety of measures indicate how filers allocated their
refund: how they chose to receive their refund (e.g.,
direct deposit or paper check), whether they split the
CSD.WUSTL.EDU // 9

Table 2. Participation and Response Summary by R2S
Data Source
R2S Intervention Year
Data
Tax-time experiment
No. of control participants
No. of treatment participants
Household Financial Survey
% of TTFE filers offered survey
HFS1 take-up rate
HFS2 take-up rate

2015

2016

161,952
484,164

70,978
213,147

50.0
4.6
34.3

50.0
5.4
42.3

Note. R2S = Refund to Savings Initiative; TTFE = TurboTax Freedom
Edition; HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave; HFS2 =
Household Financial Survey, second wave.
refund, whether they purchased U.S. savings bonds,
and whether they deposited any of the refund into
a savings vehicle, as well as the amount of refund
deposited to savings or checking.
For the general impact evaluation of R2S, the research
team uses this aggregated, deidentified tax data on
hundreds of thousands of TTFE tax filers. Provided
by Intuit in a manner consistent with U.S. laws and
regulations, these data enable the team to analyze the
filing behavior of different groups (e.g., the control
and treatment groups, filers who claim the EITC and
those who do not). We also receive individual-level
tax data on TTFE filers who consent to share their
administrative data and participate in the HFS.
Longitudinal Data from the HFS.—Immediately after
participants submit their tax returns, a screen in TTFE
randomly invites half of refund-receiving filers to
participate in the HFS. Administered using Qualtrics
online software, the HFS takes about 20 minutes to
complete. Participants are allowed to skip questions,
and they receive a $5 online Amazon.com gift card
as compensation for their participation. After filing
their taxes, 14,993 R2S participants completed HFS1
in 2015, and 5,146 of these completed HFS2. In 2016,
13,316 R2S participants completed HFS1 and 5,636
completed HFS2.7
The HFS covers a wide array of financial topics,
querying participants about what they plan to do
with their tax refund, how much debt they owe, the
value of their assets, whether they could come up
with $2,000 in an emergency, their experiences
with material hardship, and whether they have
faced financial shocks. Six months after filing their
taxes, those who participated in HFS1 are invited to
complete HFS2, which asks about their actual use of
the refunds and any changes in financial status. At the
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beginning of the survey process, participants grant
consent enabling Intuit to share the individual-level
tax data. This ensures that R2S researchers have robust
administrative tax data for every HFS participant.

Analytical Strategy—Tax Time Impact
Evaluating the impact of R2S on tax-time savings
behaviors is fairly straightforward. The randomization
of TTFE filers into a control group and intervention
conditions should minimize the imbalance between
groups, and so we estimated the impact of R2S
through an intent-to-treat measure that captured the
average impact of the intervention for each treatment
group relative to that for the control group:
ITT = YO − YC ,

(1)

where YO was the average outcome for the group
exposed to the R2S interventions, and YC was the
average outcome for the control group. Outcomes
explored in this analysis included the rate at which
filers deposited the refund into a savings vehicle,
the amount deposited into savings, the rate at which
they split the refund between a savings vehicle and a
different account, and the rate at which they deposited
the entire refund to savings.

R2S Results
Participant Characteristics
In total, 646,116 TTFE users participated in the R2S
experiment in 2015 and 284,125 participated in
2016. The reported characteristics of the two groups
were similar. As Table 3 shows, the mean age of
TTFE was around 35 years, about two thirds filed as
single, around 30% had dependents, and the average
household AGI was between $14,000 and $15,000.8
The refund-related characteristics of the two groups
were also similar across 2015 and 2016. The average
federal tax refund was around $2,000. Filers had
about $420 in tax liability and withheld around
$1,100. Approximately 40% received the EITC, and
the average EITC was around $2,300. About 11.5%
deposited any of their refund into a savings vehicle,
and very few filers split their refund between accounts.

Understanding the Financial Lives
of Filers Through the HFS
As described previously, the HFS provides a wealth
of information regarding the financial lives of TTFE
users. This includes data on account ownership, access
to credit, experience with hardship, employment
status, demographic information, and use of

Table 3. Characteristics of R2S Participants (2015 and 2016)
% or Mean (SD)
Characteristic

2015

2016

35.3 (15.5)

35.3 (16.2)

Age (mean, in years)
Filing status (%)
Single
Head of household
Married, filing jointly, widow(er)
Married, filing separately
Any dependents (%)
No. of dependents (mean)
Adjusted gross income ($)

66.8
68.6
22.9
22.2
9.4
8.4
0.9
0.8
31.4
29.5
0.5 (0.9)
0.5 (0.9)
14,846 (9,896) 14,409 (9,902)

Tax-related characteristics
Federal tax refund ($)
Federal tax liability ($)
Amount withheld ($)
% receiving EITC
EITC amount ($)
% depositing any refund into savings
% who split refund
Observations

2,030 (2,379)
422 (706)
1,077 (1,138)
41.9
2,358 (1,923)
11.7
2.2
646,116

1,955 (2,375)
423 (707)
1,078 (1,139)
39.6
2,357 (1,923)
12.2
1.5
284,125

Note. R2S = Refund to Savings; TTFE = TurboTax Freedom Edition;
EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit.

Table 4. Household Financial Survey
Participant Characteristics (2016)
Characteristic
Owns savings account
Owns checking account
Owns credit card
Median credit debt ($)a
Median liquid assets ($)b
$2,000 in emergency
Used alternative financial services
Transaction servicesc
Credit servicesd
Student
Employed
Race
White, non-Hispanic
Black, non-Hispanic
Asian, non-Hispanic
Hispanic

% or $
73.4
93.6
66.7
200
720
49.2
27.4
17.4
18.2
32.8
77.0
72.1
7.7
4.9
9.6

Note. N = 13,316.
a
Respondents who did not own credit cards were listed as having
$0 in credit card debt.
b
Includes value of savings account, checking account, and cash on
hand.
c
Includes check cashers, money orders, and wire transfers.
d
Includes payday loans, pawn shops, auto-title loans, rent-to-own
services, and payroll cards.

alternative financial services such as payday loans
or check cashers. As Table 4 illustrates, a majority of
HFS participants in the 2016 HFS1 owned savings
or checking accounts, although the rate of savingsaccount ownership lagged behind that of checkingaccount ownership. Almost 70% owned a credit
card, about a third were students, and over three
fourths were employed. Looking specifically at the
financial characteristics of this sample, we see that
most members were fairly liquidity constrained. The
median reported liquid assets for participants was
$720, with $200 in median credit card debt. Just under
half of participants said they could come up with
$2,000 in an emergency. Overall, participants in the
2016 R2S closely resembled participants in 2015.
The HFS also provides information on financial
shocks and material hardships that participants
encountered in the 6 months prior to the survey. In
total, 54.2% of participants in the 2016 HFS reported
experiencing a financial shock in the 6 months prior to
the survey. As Figure 9 illustrates, the most commonly
reported shocks were unexpected car repairs (31.1%)
and unexpected reductions in income (21.1%). The
prevalence of reported material hardship was even
more troubling. Over 60% of participants reported
experiencing a hardship in the 6 months prior to the
survey. Forty percent reported skipping a bill, 27.9%
experienced food insecurity, and 16.0% were unable to
pay their full rent or mortgage (Figure 10). Additionally,
substantial percentages of respondents skipped some
sort of health care service—a doctor visit, a dentist visit,
or getting a prescription filled—because they could
not afford it. Taken together, these results suggest that
financial shocks were common among the 2016 HFS
participants but that they had limited assets and limited
access to emergency resources to manage these shocks.
The findings therefore illustrate the challenge and
the importance of the R2S Initiative. This population,
although likely to benefit from increased savings, may
also struggle to cover day-to-day expenses. Those
struggles make saving difficult.

The Impact of R2S at Tax Time
The Impact of the 2015 R2S Interventions
Figure 11 illustrates the impact of R2S interventions
on the key outcome variable in the experiment: The
rate at which filers deposit any of their tax refund
into a savings vehicle. Relative to the control group,
all 2015 R2S treatment conditions substantially
increased the total rate of filers depositing any of
their refund to a savings vehicle. In the control
group, 8.5% of filers deposited any of the refund to
savings. In comparison, some portion of the refund
was deposited to a savings vehicle by 13.4% of the
CSD.WUSTL.EDU // 11
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Figure 9. Percentages of 2016 Household Financial Survey participants who reported experiencing any financial shock
and particular financial shocks (n = 13,316).
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Figure 10. Percentages of 2016 Household Financial Survey participants who reported experiencing any hardship and
particular hardships in the prior 6 months (n = 13,316).
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Figure 11. Rate of depositing any of the refund to a
savings vehicle, 2015 (N = 646,116).

Figure 12. Dollar amount deposited to savings vehicles,
2015 (N = 646,116).

***p < .001 (different from control).

***p < .001 (different from control).
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Precautionary Saving intervention group, 12.6% of the
Interactive Goal group, and 12.5% of the Interactive
Retirement group. The impacts were highly significant
across all intervention conditions. Precautionary
Saving, the condition with the largest effect, included
an emergency savings message, and exposure to that
condition led to a 58% increase in the rate of refund
savings deposits. This condition was also significantly
more effective than the two interactive conditions,
though the absolute differences were not large.
As Figure 12 illustrates, the 2015 R2S interventions
increased the average amount of refund deposited
to savings, and the average for each of the three
treatment groups was significantly higher than that
for the control group. In the most effective condition,
the Precautionary Saving intervention, filers deposited
$244 to a savings vehicle on average; in comparison,
the average deposited by the control group was $160,
a 53% difference. The other two conditions increased
average savings deposits by similar levels.
Given the finding that the 2015 interventions increased
both the rate of savings deposits and the amount
deposited, it is important to understand whether
the savings increases were driven by increases in the
amount deposited to savings or simply by the increases
in the rate of savings deposits. To assess this, we focused
on the amounts deposited into savings vehicles by
those who opted to make savings deposits, finding that
the average savings deposits by savings depositors in
the control group ($1,886) were significantly higher
than those by depositors in the treatment groups:
On average, the Precautionary Saving depositors
placed $1,824 of the refund into savings vehicles, the
Interactive Goal depositors placed $1,817 into savings,
and the Interactive Retirement depositors placed
$1,834 into savings. This indicates that the impact of
the R2S interventions stemmed not from encouraging
filers to deposit more of their refund into a savings
account but rather from encouraging more people to
deposit their refund into savings.

Figure 13. Rate of splitting between multiple accounts,
2015 (N = 646,116).
***p < .001 (different from control).
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Figure 14. Rate of filers depositing whole refund to savings
vehicle, 2015 (N = 646,116).
***p < .001 (different from control).
Figures 13 and 14 illustrate why this might be the case.
Figure 13 depicts the rates at which filers split their
refund between a savings account and some other account, and Figure 14 shows the rates at which filers
deposited their entire refund into a savings account.
Taken together, these results show that the most typical
behavior among those who deposited any of the refund
to a savings account was to deposit the entire refund
into savings. Around 12% of tax filers in the treatment
groups chose the option of depositing the entire refund into a savings account, and approximately 1% split
the refund into more than one account. This further
suggests that the impact of the R2S interventions is extensive rather than intensive; that is, the interventions
drive more people to make savings deposits, rather
than driving people to deposit more to savings. This result is to be expected in an environment where people’s
preferences are to deposit solely into one account.
However, these results indicate that the R2S
interventions also increased the rate of splitting.
Around 0.9% of the treatment condition filers split their
refund, compared to 0.7% of the control filers. This may
be due in part to the fact that the choice architecture of
the 2015 intervention emphasized splitting, which was
the second option given in the treatment conditions. In
the control condition, the splitting option was shown
at the bottom of the list and did not mention saving.
Despite this difference, it is worth noting that overall
rates of splitting were low across conditions.

The Impact of the 2016 R2S Interventions
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In general, the results from the 2016 R2S savings
interventions (n = 284,125) were similar to those from
the 2015 experiment. In each intervention group, the
percentage of tax filers depositing any of their refund
into a savings vehicle was higher than the percentage of
control-group filers who did so (Figure 15). Specifically,
9.2% of filers in the control group deposited any of
their refund to savings; the same was true of 13.2% in
the Choice Architecture group, 13.4% in the Choice
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Figure 15. Deposits to savings: All interventions, 2016
(n = 284,125). Msg. = message.
***p < .001 (different from control).
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Figure 16. Average savings deposits by intervention, 2016
(n = 284,125). Msg. = message.
***p < .001 (different from control).
Architecture + Noninteractive Emergency Messaging
group, and 12.9% in the Choice Architecture +
Interactive Emergency Messaging group. Interestingly,
the effects of choice architecture alone appear to be
similar to the effects of combining choice architecture
with emergency messaging. This suggests that the
choice architecture element of the intervention may be
the primary driver of the increased savings deposits.
In 2016 as in 2015, average savings deposit amounts
were higher for all intervention groups than for
the control group (Figure 16). Both of the groups
exposed to a combination of choice architecture and
emergency messaging had average savings deposits
of $222. The average for the control group was $162,
and that for the Choice Architecture group was $215.
Again, we see that the effect of choice architecture by
itself was similar to the effect of combining choice
architecture with emergency messaging.
Finally, the 2016 R2S interventions enabled us to
document a highly significant increase in the percentage
of filers depositing their entire refund into savings
(Figure 17). The percentage of filers depositing the whole
refund into savings was highest among the Choice
Architecture + Noninteractive Emergency Messaging
group (12.84%) and lowest among counterparts in the
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control group (8.74%). As with the other results, the
effects of the Choice Architecture condition were
similar to those of the two conditions combining choice
architecture with emergency messaging.
We also examined the impact of the interactive
messaging prompt itself. As noted above, one
innovation implemented in 2016 was to incorporate
a highly salient interactive messaging prompt that
encouraged filers to identify the types of emergencies
for which they would be saving their refund. This was
motivated by two findings from the 2015 iteration of
R2S: First, emergency messaging was more effective
than other messaging related to financial goals (either
general goals or retirement goals), and second, filers did
not interact with prompts placed on the same screen
where they were asked to select how they would like the
refund to be deposited. To address these issues, the 2016
interactive emergency messaging prompt was placed
on its own screen rather than on the deposit screen.
However, filers assigned to the 2016 Choice Architecture
+ Interactive Emergency Messaging condition were not
required to interact with the prompt.
The results from that intervention showed that a higher
percentage of filers interacted with the prompt when
it was shown on its own: 7.3% of filers interacted with it
in 2016, but only 1.0% did so in 2015. This suggests that
placing the prompt on a screen of its own increased the
salience of the messaging. Despite this, the interactive
prompt did not seem to be successful in driving taxtime savings behavior. As noted above (Figure 15),
refunds were deposited into savings by 12.93% of filers
who saw the prompt as part of the Choice Architecture
+ Interactive Emergency Messaging condition and by
13.21% of those assigned to the Choice Architecture
condition (with no message, a nonsignificant difference
of .28 percentage points). When compared with the
Choice Architecture + Noninteractive Emergency
Messaging condition, which drove 13.44% of filers
to make savings deposits, the Choice Architecture +
Interactive Emergency Messaging condition actually

Figure 17. Percentages of filers depositing the entire
refund into savings, by intervention, 2016 (N = 284,125).
Msg. = message.
***p < .001 (different from control).
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led to a statistically significant 0.51 percentage-point
reduction in the rate at which filers deposited into
savings (p < .01). This lack of observed impact held when
we restricted the analyses to those who interacted with
the prompt, and it also held when we used regression
techniques to control for the factors that might be
associated with choosing to interact with the prompt.9

Discussion of the 2015 and 2016 R2S Interventions
The goal of the R2S interventions in both 2015 and
2016, as in 2013, was to increase refund savings deposits
among TTFE users at tax time in order to improve this
population’s financial well-being. The 2013 intervention
tested the effects of motivational messaging and
anchoring on tax-time savings deposits, finding that
the behavioral economics tools increased the rates at
which filers saved and split their refund as well as the
average amount deposited into savings. The 2015 and
2016 interventions built on these findings by testing the
effects of choice architecture and additional messaging
strategies. Our analyses of data from both years found
that each tested treatment yielded higher rates of
savings deposits and higher amounts deposited to
savings. Although the overall behavioral shifts effected
through these low-touch interventions are impressive,
the scale of the interventions leads to a substantial
aggregate impact for the R2S population. Across the
2015 and 2016 intervention years, R2S generated
29,536 additional savers and an additional $48 million
deposited to savings vehicles (see Figure 18).
Results from the 2015 R2S intervention suggested
that choice architecture and each of the three
messaging strategies were effective at increasing
savings deposits. In the 2016 intervention, we
sought to separate the effects of choice architecture
from those of combining choice architecture with
messaging. We found that choice architecture by
itself is an effective driver of refund savings deposits
and that the additional effects of messaging prompts
are fairly minimal. Indeed, these results suggest that
certain types of messaging may actually be harmful,
as the rate of savings deposits generated by the 2016
interactive prompt was significantly lower than the
rate generated by the 2016 passive prompt. This
result may have implications for the design of similar
interventions: Incorporating interactive elements
or elaborate messaging conditions may mitigate the
impact of more passive interventions like changes to
the choice architecture of a decision environment.
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Figure 18. Effects of 2015 and 2016 R2S on numbers of filers
depositing and amounts deposited (2015 N = 646,116; 2016
N = 284,125).
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%

2013
Control

2015

2016

Best Intervention

Figure 19. Any of the refund deposited into savings:
Control vs. best intervention, 2013, 2015, and 2016.
Both the 2015 and 2016 interventions yielded higher
rates of savings deposits than those induced by the
2013 intervention (Figure 19). It is interesting to note,
however, that the savings deposit rate of the control
group has increased year over year. Over this same
period, the personal saving rate in the United States has
been roughly stable (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
n.d.). It is possible that returning tax filers (those who
use TTFE in multiple years) who are randomly assigned
to a treatment group in one year are more likely to
deposit their refund into savings if they are assigned
to a control group in a subsequent year. Although not
conclusive, this pattern may indicate that shifts in
behavior during one tax year persist into the future.

Across the 2015 and 2016 intervention years, R2S generated 29,536 additional savers
and an additional $48 million deposited to savings
CSD.WUSTL.EDU // 15

It is possible that returning tax filers …
randomly assigned to a treatment group in
one year are more likely to deposit their
refund into savings if they are assigned to
a control group in a subsequent year.
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Part 3

The Impacts of R2S 6 Months After Tax Filing

The analyses reported above have established that
low-touch interventions like those employed by R2S
can make substantial impacts on savings behavior
at tax time. However, those findings do not address
whether the effects of the interventions persist over
time. The 2013 R2S interventions demonstrated
that filers exposed to certain R2S interventions were
more likely than counterparts in the control group
to have some of their refund saved 6 months after
filing (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2015). Specifically, the
likelihood of having some of the refund saved at the
6-month mark was higher among filers exposed to
higher suggested savings amounts (30%–31% relative to
the 26% savings rate for the control group).
This section of the report extends that analysis by
examining the impact of the 2015 interventions on
refund savings 6 months after filing. Specifically, this
section examines three questions around the 6-month
impacts of the R2S interventions:

What is the overall impact of the R2S
interventions 6 months after tax filing?

Are the R2S interventions more effective for
households with persistent financial constraints
than for other sampled households?

How does access to emergency savings moderate
the 6-month impact of R2S interventions?

Identifying a Target Population
for the R2S 6-Month Analysis
In general, asset building initiatives like IDAs, CDAs,
and R2S have been identified as means to help lowincome households improve their financial situation
(Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2015; Marks, Engelhardt,

Rhodes, & Wallace, 2014; Mills et al., 2016; Sherraden,
1991). A challenge in understanding how those
initiatives affect low-income households, however,
is that the definition of low income—a designation
typically based on household earnings—obscures
important differences among households. For
example, household income could be low due to a
temporary circumstance, such as a spell of short-term
unemployment or higher education enrollment, and
it is likely that households in such situations will have
higher earnings in the foreseeable future. Therefore,
they are likely different from households experiencing
multiyear spells of poverty due, for example, to
employment in persistently low-wage occupations or
to health issues that prevent full-time employment.
Distinguishing between transitory and long-term
poverty is a well-established practice in the literature
(e.g., Cellini, McKernan, & Ratcliffe, 2008; McKay,
2009; McKernan & Ratcliffe, 2002). The distinction
is borne out by historical estimates of the likelihood
of a household leaving poverty. Research using the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics has found that the
likelihood of exiting poverty over the course of a year is
fairly high but drops rapidly as the duration of a poverty
spell grows (Bane & Ellwood, 1986; Stevens, 1994).
Through these analyses, we also sought to understand
the impact of the interventions on what might be
considered the target population for R2S; that is, the
population that likely stands to benefit the most from
interventions to develop their emergency savings.
The specification of a target population is important
because the TTFE population, though almost entirely
comprised of low-income households (other than
a small percentage of higher income active-duty
military households), is relatively heterogeneous. In
2015, for example, 14% of filers reported unexpectedly
losing a job during the 6 months prior to tax filing,

23% reported experiencing an unexpected reduction
in income during that period, and 14% reported being
unemployed in that time.10 Additionally, 34.2% of
HFS respondents were students, and it is likely that
their savings needs differed considerably from those
of the general population. These results suggest that
many of the households in the TTFE sample may be
transitorily low income—that is, their income may
have fallen below the threshold required for access to
the free TTFE product, but they were not necessarily
chronically low income or they were students whose
financial circumstances were likely to shift significantly
when they completed their education.
Although efforts to promote the accumulation of
assets can have immensely beneficial effects in many
LMI households, it is not clear that public policy
should focus on savings accumulation in households
experiencing temporary spells of poverty or in those
with working-age members who are enrolled in
school. Households with temporarily low income
likely need the tax refund to maintain consumption
until changes in circumstances lead to increases in
earnings or until education is completed.
This understanding of the nature of poverty and
the goals of asset-building programs enabled us to
identify the target population for the R2S savings
interventions: Households that experience persistent
financial constraint but include no enrolled adult
student at tax time. We define persistent financial
constraint as multiple, consecutive years of low
earnings. For these analyses, households are deemed
to have persistent financial constraints if they are
represented in TTFE data for at least two consecutive
years (and therefore have income below TTFE’s
threshold or receive the EITC). The HFS data are used
to distinguish households that include adult students
from households that do not.

Methods
Sample
The sample used in the 6-month analyses is similar
to the sample used in the assessment of the tax-time
impacts of the 2015 R2S interventions: Households that
have annual AGI below $31,000, are EITC recipients,
or include members on active duty in the U.S. military
and have annual AGI below $60,000. There are two key
differences between this sample and that drawn for the
tax-time analyses. First, the 6-month analytic sample
only includes households that completed both the
first and second waves of the HFS. Second, we restrict
the analyses to households that had savings accounts
at tax time. The reason for this restriction is that the
R2S interventions are largely targeted at those who
18 // JUNE 2018

have savings accounts. The goal of the interventions
is to encourage deposits into savings vehicles, so we
would not expect households that lack savings accounts
to be impacted by the intervention. In total, 75% of
households had savings accounts at tax time.

Data
The analyses of the 6-month impacts of the
interventions drew almost exclusively upon data from
the longitudinal HFS rather than upon administrative
tax data provided by Intuit. As noted above (see p. 10
of this report), half of refund-receiving TTFE users
were invited to complete HFS1 immediately after filing
their taxes; these filers were contacted again 6 months
after filing and invited to take part in HFS2.
In total, 14,993 households in the R2S experiment
completed HFS1 and 5,518 completed HFS2. After
exclusions due to missing data, our full sample
included 5,457 tax filers. Of these respondents, 4,443
owned savings accounts and 1,194 of these met the
criteria for our target population; that is, they were
nonstudents with persistent financial constraints.
The outcome variables for these analyses were drawn
exclusively from HFS2. The control variables come
from HFS1 and the administrative tax data.

Analytical Strategy—6 Month Impacts
The evaluation of the experiment’s tax time impacts
leveraged the experimental design of R2S to directly
compare the treatment and control groups’ savings
behaviors when they filed their taxes. For the 6-month
analyses, we generated regression-adjusted estimates
of the 6-month impacts. This approach allowed us
to control for any baseline differences between the
control and treatment respondents who participated
in the HFS2. It also enabled a more precise read on the
overall impact of the treatments. For each outcome
explored here, the impact is therefore the regressionadjusted difference between 6-month outcomes for
the treatment group and those for the control group.
For a subset of the 6-month analyses reported in
this section, we examined how access to emergency
financial resources interacted with the R2S savings
interventions. This allowed us to assess whether R2S
has helped build savings among households lacking
substantial emergency resources that could help to
buffer the effects of financial shocks.

Outcome Variables
Two outcome variables were used in these analyses.
The first was an indicator variable capturing whether
an HFS2 respondent had any of the refund saved 6
months after filing. This variable was coded 1 if the

filer still had some of the refund and 0 otherwise.
The other outcome variable was the proportion of the
refund still saved 6 months after filing. This variable
was measured on a scale from 0% to 100%.

Control Variables
Although the outcome variables for these analyses
were measured 6 months after participants filed their
taxes, the control variables were measured at the time
of tax filing. The control variables came from both the
administrative tax data and the data collected through
HFS1. In analyzing the administrative data from filers’
tax forms, we controlled for the AGI and the federal
tax-refund amount. In analyzing data from HFS1, we
controlled for the following:

The reported experience of any of seven material
hardships in the 6 months prior to filing. The
measured hardships stem directly from financial
difficulties: self-reported occurrences of skipping
rent, skipping any bills, skipping medical or
dental care, skipping necessary prescriptions,
being unable to afford the necessary type or
amount of food, overdrawing a bank account,
and having a credit card declined because the
respondent’s balance exceeded the credit limit.
Respondents were asked a series of yes-or-no
questions about their experience with these
hardships. The answers were coded as 1 if they
had experienced any of these hardships and 0
otherwise.

The reported experience of any of seven
financial shocks in the 6 months prior to filing.
The shocks included the following: losing a
job unexpectedly or having an unexpected
reduction in income; having an unexpected
home or vehicle repair; having unexpected
legal expenses; having expenses due to a natural
disaster; having unexpected, major, out-ofpocket medical expenses; being the victim of a
crime affecting finances or property; and having
a major life change that affected the respondent
financially (e.g., a divorce or the birth of a child).
Respondents were asked a series of yes-or-no
questions about their experience with these
shocks, and their responses were coded as 1 if
they had experienced any of these shocks and 0
otherwise.

Access to $2,000 in an emergency. Respondents
were asked, “How confident are you that you could
come up with $2,000 if an unexpected need arose
within the next month?” If these respondents
reported that they were “certain” or that they
“could probably” come up with the full $2,000, the

variable was coded as 1. If they reported that they
were “certain” or that they “could probably” not
come up with the full $2,000, it was coded as 0.

The amount of self-reported credit card debt.
Respondents’ budgeting behavior. Respondents
were asked whether they identified with the
following statement: “I budget carefully.” If they
responded that the statement was “very much like
me,” “mostly like me,” or “somewhat like me,” the
variable was coded as 1. If they reported that the
statement was “not much like me” or “not at all like
me,” it was coded as 0.
These baseline controls were chosen because they
succinctly captured many aspects of filers’ financial
lives: behaviors, balance sheets, incomes, refund
characteristics, the amount of volatility in their lives,
and the financial constraints to which they were
exposed. Controlling for these key financial indicators
ensured that the treatment and control groups were
as similar as possible and that estimates of treatment
effects are precise. Although randomization should
have balanced the groups, the use of control variables
also enabled us to account for any imbalance that may
have emerged from differential propensities among
the groups to select into both waves of the HFS.

The 6-Month Impacts of R2S
What Is the Overall Impact of the R2S Intervention
6 Months After Tax Filing?
Figure 20 presents estimates of the regressionadjusted impact of R2S on the likelihood that tax
filers had some of the refund saved after 6 months. In
general, among LMI filers who could have deposited to
savings at tax time (i.e., they owned savings accounts),
there is a directional but nonsignificant relationship
between assignment to the Precautionary Saving
condition and having some of the refund saved after 6

Figure 20. Percentages of R2S participants who still had
some refund saved 6 months after filing (n = 4,443).
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months: 37.9% of filers assigned to that condition still
had some refund saved, but the same was true for only
35.0% of the control group (an 8% difference; p = .13).
The other conditions appeared to be less effective at
driving saving 6 months after tax filing.

Are the R2S Interventions More Effective for
Households With Persistent Financial Constraints?
As we explained above, the target population for
R2S interventions consists of households that
have persistent financial constraints but no adult
members enrolled in school. This is the population
typically targeted by asset-building initiatives aimed
at decreasing poverty. As Figure 21 illustrates, these
households benefitted disproportionately from the
R2S interventions. In each treatment condition,
the percentage of filers with some of the refund
in savings after 6 months was higher than the
percentage of control-group filers with savings at
that point. The Precautionary Saving condition was
the most effective at driving increased savings rates:
Filers in this condition were 10 percentage points
more likely than counterparts in the control group to
have any of the refund saved after 6 months (p < .01).
Figure 22 illustrates the regression-adjusted
proportions of the refunds saved across treatment
groups, relative to the control group. Only filers in
the Precautionary Saving condition had a significantly
higher proportion of the refund in savings after 6
months: On average, filers exposed to this condition
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Figure 21. Percentages of R2S participants with persistent
financial constraints and some refund saved 6 months
after filing (n = 1,194).
p < .10; **p < .01 (different from control).
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Figure 22. Proportions of refunds saved 6 months after
filing among R2S participants with persistent financial
constraints (n = 1,194).
p < .10 (different from control).

†

Filers in the Precautionary Saving condition had a
significantly higher proportion of the refund in savings
after 6 months: On average, filers exposed to this condition
saved 5% more of their refund than did counterparts in the
control group. Given the average refund of this population
($2,052), the increase translates to an additional $100 in
savings 6 months after filing
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though … messaging at tax time had little impact on tax-time
savings deposits, certain types of messages can help shift
filers’ savings behaviors in the period after filing.

saved 5% more of their refund than did counterparts
in the control group. Given the average refund of
this population ($2,052), the increase translates to an
additional $100 in savings 6 months after filing.

How Does Access to Emergency Savings
Moderate the 6-Month Impact of the
R2S Interventions Among Constrained Households?
Having established that the R2S interventions were
associated with increased savings 6 months after
filing among households with persistent financial
constraints, we examined how this impact was
moderated by access to a substantial amount of
emergency resources. Figure 23 shows the regressionadjusted 6-month R2S results among two groups
of households with persistent financial constraints:
households reporting that they could access $2,000
in an emergency at the time of tax filing and those
reporting that they could not. The results show that
the 6-month benefits of R2S are concentrated among
those who were unable to access such resources, and
the largest effect was observed among filers in the
Precautionary Saving condition. Specifically, filers in
the Precautionary Saving condition who could not
access $2,000 in an emergency were almost twice
as likely as filers in the control group to have any
of the refund saved after 6 months. The finding is
compelling because this was the only condition in
which the intervention explicitly tied the refund to
saving for emergencies. The finding may indicate
that, though variation in messaging at tax time had
little impact on tax-time savings deposits, certain
types of messages can help shift filers’ savings
behaviors in the period after filing.
Among households with persistent financial
constraints and access to $2,000 in emergencies,
the impact of R2S was less pronounced and not
statistically significant. This is perhaps unsurprising.
The need to build savings with the refund was
probably less pressing for those households.

Discussion of the
6-Month Impacts of R2S
The results of the 6-month analyses of the 2015 R2S
interventions presented here are mixed but ultimately
very encouraging. On average, filers assigned to an
R2S treatment group and those assigned to the control
group did not differ significantly in the amount of the
refund still in savings 6 months after filing, despite
the fact that the R2S treatments were associated
with large changes in savings depositing behaviors
relative to the control. However, there were substantial
improvements among filers with persistent financial
constraints, and they likely have the most need to
build savings. The most effective treatment condition,
which combined choice architecture with messaging
that emphasized saving the refund for emergencies,
led to around a third more filers with persistent
financial constraints having some of the refund saved
6 months after filing—a difference of 10 percentage
points from the rate among filers in the control
group. These results were even stronger for those
without access to substantial emergency resources
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Figure 23. Percentages of households that had persistent
financial constraints and any refund saved 6 months after
filing. Ability to access $2,000 in an emergency was reported
at tax time (n = 1,194).
*p < .01 (different from control).
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at tax time (defined as being able to access $2,000 in
an emergency); the treatment condition focusing on
emergency savings effectively doubled the 6-month
refund savings rate among filers with persistent
financial constraints.
It is worth noting the relationship between the impacts
of these interventions and the relative time involved in
the interventions. Compared with filers in the control
group, members of the 2015 R2S treatment groups
spent 3.6 seconds more on the intervention screens
that incorporated one of three messaging conditions
and choice architecture emphasizing savings.
Despite this small amount of time, the interventions
demonstrated large impacts in driving behavior at tax
time and led to increased savings for a key population
even 6 months after filing.

The impacts of these interventions, both at tax
time and 6 months after filing, are somewhat
remarkable given that the interventions add
less than 10 seconds to the entire tax-filing
process. This demonstrates that even extremely
low-touch interventions have the potential to
substantially shift individual behaviors and
that these impacts can last over time.
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Conclusion and Policy Implications

This report presents the impacts of the Refund to
Savings Initiative in the years of 2015 and 2016. The
fundamental idea underlying R2S is that tax time
represents an important opportunity to address the
low rates of saving observed among LMI households
in the United States, and the low rates of emergency
saving in particular. The tax refund is the largest
amount of money many LMI households receive all
year. The tax moment is therefore an opportunity
for holistic consideration of household finances and
financial goals. Intervention at tax time may help
these households build savings—an accomplishment
that is perhaps beyond their ability through the rest of
the year.
The R2S interventions primarily used two techniques
informed by behavioral economics—the use of
persuasive message and choice architecture—to
encourage LMI filers to deposit their tax refund into
a savings vehicle such as a savings account or U.S.
savings bond. The results demonstrate that these taxtime interventions were very successful at changing
the refund depositing behavior of LMI tax filers. In
2015, the most successful intervention combined
choice architecture with messaging around the need
to build emergency savings. That intervention resulted
in a 58% increase in the rate at which filers deposited
their refund into a savings vehicle. Similar results were
observed in 2016.
Although more mixed than the findings on the
intervention effects at tax time, the findings
concerning the interventions’ impacts on savings
held 6 months after tax filing are still very
encouraging. In general, we observed directional
increases in the 6-month savings rates of treatment
participants relative to the rate among counterparts
in the control group, but these effects were not
statistically significant. However, in analyzing the

6-month impacts of R2S interventions, we observed
pronounced and significant differences among the
sampled households that faced persistent financial
constraints. These results were even stronger for
households that lacked emergency savings and were
exposed to messaging around the importance of
saving the tax refund for emergencies.
The impacts of these interventions, both at tax time
and 6 months after filing, are somewhat remarkable
given that the interventions add less than 10 seconds
to the entire tax-filing process.11 This demonstrates
that even extremely low-touch interventions have the
potential to substantially shift individual behaviors
and that these impacts can last over time.
The findings presented in this report have a number
of implications for policy and practice. First and
foremost, the results demonstrate that tax time can
serve as a key moment to promote savings in LMI
households. Although tax credits like the EITC can
enhance the financial security of working tax filers,
many LMI households likely need additional support
and incentives to build emergency savings or to save
for other long-term purposes.
Our findings also offer lessons for the design of similar
interventions. The first is that choice architecture is
a stronger driver of behavior change than persuasive
messaging is. This may be due to the nature of tax
filing: The R2S interventions occur near the very end
of the tax-filing process, when tax filers may be tired
or inattentive from filling out their taxes. As such,
interventions that require minimal engagement or
that make saving as simple as possible—for example,
making saving the entire tax refund the most
salient deposit option—may be more effective than
interventions that require filers to read and consider
different messages.

However, messaging can still have an incremental
impact on savings behavior. Another implication
from this work is that messaging on emergency
savings is somewhat more effective than messaging
on general financial goals or on retirement savings.
This is unsurprising. Among LMI households, saving
for emergencies is likely a more pressing priority
than saving for general goals or retirement. Levels
of emergency savings are generally low in these
households and financial shocks are relatively frequent.
Of course, there is also evidence that messaging—
though less effective at changing tax time behaviors—
is effective at changing downstream behaviors. Filers
who lacked emergency savings at tax time appeared
to respond to the emergency messaging they received
through the R2S intervention; the percentage of
filers with some of the refund still in savings at the
6-month mark was higher among those exposed to
the emergency messaging than among filers in other
interventions.
Finally, these findings have implications for the
measurement of tax-time savings interventions. Many
Volunteer Income Tax Assistance sites promote tax
refund saving. They often identify tax-refund savers
as those who split their refund between a savings
account (or U.S. savings bonds) and some other
account. However, the R2S Initiative has consistently
shown that rates of splitting are very low among LMI
tax filers. In 2015, members of the control group
split their refunds at a rate of 0.7%, and those in
the treatment groups split their refunds at a rate of
0.9%—despite a choice architecture that emphasized
splitting the refund into a savings account as the
second-most salient deposit option. In 2013, an even
greater emphasis was placed on splitting the refund.
Despite the use of savings anchors that encouraged
filers to save a given percentage of the refund or a
specific dollar amount, split rates were relatively low
(Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2015). These findings clearly
suggest that LMI tax filers have an overwhelming bias
in favor of depositing the refund into a single account.
Practitioners should therefore consider orienting their
savings programs to emphasize depositing the entire
refund into savings.
The R2S Initiative demonstrates that small changes
to tax filers’ decision-making environment can have
substantial impacts on savings behavior. Future
R2S experiments will continue to explore the use
of behavioral economics tools in order to optimize
tax-time financial-security interventions. The R2S
Initiative will also continue to study the persistence
of the effects of tax-time interventions on LMI
households’ financial behavior and well-being.
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Appendixes
Appendix A
2015 R2S Intervention:
Precautionary Savings and Interactive Retirement Conditions

Figure A1. The deposit screen shown to the Precautionary
Saving intervention group.

Figure A1. The deposit screen shown to the Interactive
Retirement intervention group.

Appendix B
Participant Characteristics: 2015 and 2016 R2S Intervention Groups
Table B1. Participant Characteristics by 2015 R2S Intervention Group
Characteristic

Control

Precautionary Interactive Interactive
Saving
Goal
Retirement

Demographics
Age (mean, in years)
35.28 (15.48) 35.25 (15.44)
35.18 (15.46) 35.27 (15.50)
Filing status (%)
Single
66.8
66.8
66.9
66.8
Head of household
22.9
22.9
22.7
22.9
Married, filing jointly
9.3
9.3
9.4
9.3
% with any dependents
31.4
31.4
31.3
31.4
No. of dependents (mean) 0.54 (0.94)
0.53 (0.93)
0.54 (0.94)
0.54 (0.94)
Adjusted gross income ($) 14,862 (9,902) 14,847 (9,893) 14,809 (9,904) 14,864 (9,887)
Tax-related characteristics
Federal tax refund ($)
2,035 (2,373)
Federal tax liability ($)
426 (711)
Amount withheld ($)
1,105 (1,147)
% receiving EITC
42.0
EITC amount ($)
2,290 (1,875)
Observations
161,952

2,026 (2,382)
428 (710)
1,104 (1,182)
42.0
2,279 $1,872)
161,011

2,025 (2,388) 2,033 (2,373)
423 (706)
427 (711)
1,102 (1,175) 1,108 (1,141)
41.8
41.8
2,283 (1,873) 2,295 (1,877)
161,936
161,217

Note. R2S = Refund to Savings Initiative; EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit. No significant
differences across intervention groups. Standard deviations shown in parentheses.
Table B1. Participant Characteristics by 2016 R2S Intervention Group
Characteristic

Control

CA Only

CA + Emer.
Message

CA +
Interactive
Emer. Prompt

Demographics
Age (mean, in years)
35.23 (16.17) 35.22 (16.1)
Filing status (%)
Single
68.5
68.8
Head of household
22.3
22.1
Married, filing jointly
8.3
8.2
% with any dependents
29.6
29.3
No. of dependents (mean) 0.50 (0.91) 0.50 (0.91)
Adjusted gross income ($) 14,433 (9,922) 14,344 (9,877)

35.15 (16.17)

35.27* (16.24)

68.6
22.1
8.5
29.5
0.50 (0.9)
14,432 (9,915)

68.5
22.1
8.5*
29.4
0.50 (0.91)
14,428 (9,848)

Tax-related characteristics
Federal tax refund ($)
1,959 (2,377) 1,952 (2,377)
Federal tax liability ($)
426 (708)
420 (707)
Amount withheld ($)
1,079 (1,144) 1,077 (1,142)
% receiving EITC
39.6
39.6
EITC amount ($)
2,375 (1,923) 2,347* (1,920)
Observations
70,978
70,928

1,956 (2,375)
424 (710)
1,080 (1,134)
39.6
2,362 (1,925)
71,306

1,952 (2,373)
422 (702)
1,077 (1,133)
39.7
2,344* (1,923)
70,913

Note. R2S = Refund to Savings Initiative; CA = choice architecture; Emer. = emergency;
EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit. Standard deviations shown in parentheses.
*p < .10, different from other groups
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Notes
1.

TurboTax Freedom Edition is freely available to
certain filers as part of the Internal Revenue Service’s
Free File Program. For more information, see
https://www.irs.gov/uac/about-the-free-file-program.

2.

As used in this report and in other work by the
R2S Initiative, the term splitting refers to the act of
depositing a refund into more than one account—
for example, into a checking account and a savings
account.

3.

As detailed elsewhere in this report, the R2S
Initiative collects data through the Household
Financial Survey (HFS). The first wave of this
longitudinal survey (HFS1) is conducted with filers
immediately after they file their taxes, and the
second is conducted 6 months later (HFS2).

4.

All screenshots of TurboTax Freedom Edition
are considered proprietary. Copyright is held by
Intuit, Inc.

5.

The 2016 R2S experiment also included a
component devoted to the myRA savings program.
The R2S team partnered with the U.S. Department
of the Treasury to study the retirement needs of
LMI tax filers, to test different messaging strategies,
and to experiment with interventions that used
behavioral economics to promote myRA sign-up at
tax time. The sample sizes reported for the regular
2016 R2S interventions reflect the fact that the total
participant pool was divided into seven groups: a
control group, three savings intervention groups,
and three myRA intervention groups. The results of
the 2016 myRA experiment are reported elsewhere.

6.

7.

These numbers represent a subset of TTFE filers
who received a tax refund. A subset of TTFE
participants were not randomly assigned to either
a treatment or control condition, typically because
they started the tax filing process in a different
TurboTax product before switching to TTFE. Filers
that did this were not part of the R2S experiment.
In total, 206,122 TTFE filers who received a tax
refund were not assigned to an experimental
condition in 2015 and 254,514 were not assigned to
an experimental condition in 2016.
Because some TTFE tax filers were not assigned
to an experimental condition (see Note 2),
these numbers represent a subset of the total
respondents to the HFS. In total, 5,101 HFS1
respondents were not randomly assigned to an
experimental condition in 2015 and 9,451 HFS1
respondents were not randomly assigned to an
experimental condition in 2016.

8.

See Appendix B for an examination of participant
characteristics across different treatment conditions.

9.

Although the analysis of the average treatment
impacts of R2S is straightforward due to the random
assignment into different experimental conditions,
the decision to interact with the messaging prompt
in identifying savings goals is not a random one,
and this makes it challenging to establish the
impact of the interactive messaging prompt on R2S
participants. To account for potential differences
between filers who interact with the prompts and
those who do not, we employed a two-stage least
squares model to estimate the likelihood of a
filer interacting with the prompts as a function of
both the assignment to a particular experimental
condition and an array of control variables. We used
the estimates from the first stage, which accounted
for the differences in filers’ propensities to interact
with the prompts, to provide an unbiased estimate
of the impact that interacting with the prompts had
on tax-time savings behaviors.

10. These percentages do not include students,
retirees, or homemakers.
11. This does not count any additional time required
to input a new account number. If repeat TTFE
filers had deposited to checking in a prior year,
their account information may have been saved
for use in subsequent years. In this case, had they
opted for a checking account deposit, that field
would have been prepopulated with their account
number. Encouraging them into a savings account
deposit would then require additional time to fill
in the new account information.
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